Defining the Wrongness Constraint
Identification
- Public canonical key
- radar:r-2df797db48c3d7aa99c53b32dfa599ad
- Authors
- Anna L. Peters
- Reported year
- 2025
- Reported language
- en
- Source type
- article
- First detected
- 2026-11-14T02:43:10.840073+00:00
- Last metadata observation
- 2026-11-14T02:43:10.840073+00:00
- Last HTTP verification
- Not checked
Institutions reported by the source
University of Cambridge
Reported affiliation countries
GB
Documentary abstract — original language
Abstract The idea that the wrongfulness of conduct is necessary for its criminalization to be permissible (or justified or legitimate), is widely endorsed, and even more widely discussed, in criminal law theory. However, there are significant variations in the formulations of the wrongness constraint used. Sometimes, these are explicitly addressed and defended against alternatives, but often they are not. The openness of such questions suggests that, when writing about the wrongness constraint, theorists are rarely discussing one precise, shared concept. This paper aims to remedy this situation. I examine the wrongness constraint and its constituent elements in detail to establish in what form the wrongness constraint is most consistent with the considerations that underlie it. I therefore begin by laying out the considerations I take to underlie the wrongness constraint: the impermissibility of states coercing individuals to refrain from non-wrongful conduct, and the impermissibility of states censuring non-wrongful conduct. Based on these considerations, I put forward a precise definition of the wrongness constraint: Legal officials may permissibly criminalize an act type X only if all tokens of X are extra-legally wrong, where ‘wrong’ is defined as morally wrong and ‘criminalization’ includes both the valid criminal norms created by recognized law-creating institutions and patterns of enforcement. I then defend the constituent elements of this definition against alternatives and argue that the wrongness constraint represents one duty which is borne by every official in a legal system.
Identifiers
- OPENALEX
- https://openalex.org/W4416729296
- DOI
- 10.1007/s11572-025-09770-x
Documentary context
- Documentary family
- article
- Source-reported types
- article
- Publishers
- Springer Science+Business Media
Entity mentions are not evidence of legal recognition. Jurisdiction studied is separate from author affiliation country.
Sources
OpenAlex · Record 1
Cite this reference
Anna L. Peters. Defining the Wrongness Constraint. 2025. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11572-025-09770-x
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APA, Chicago, ISO 690: bibliographic formats using available fields. OSCOLA / Bluebook: structured data only; full legal citation compliance is not claimed without verification of required elements.
- APA
- Anna L. Peters. (2025). Defining the Wrongness Constraint. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11572-025-09770-x
- Chicago
- Anna L. Peters. Defining the Wrongness Constraint. 2025. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11572-025-09770-x
- ISO 690
- Anna L. Peters. Defining the Wrongness Constraint. 2025. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11572-025-09770-x
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UDTR Global Rights of Nature Legal Library. Defining the Wrongness Constraint. Documentary record: https://www.declarationuniverselledesdroitsdelarbre.org/global-rights-of-nature-radar/reference/r-2df797db48c3d7aa99c53b32dfa599ad/ · Last HTTP verification: not performed
Research dossiers and documentary relations
Source roles
Bibliographic / original publication source · https://doi.org/10.1007/s11572-025-09770-x
An authority link alone does not verify a legal claim. Abstracts and full texts remain subject to their source terms.
Documentary status
Relevance pending
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