Enforcement, Market Distortion, and the Danger of Reforming Fundamental Rights Under Pressure
Identification
- Public canonical key
- radar:r-10c4751b6d8fd16dd7fb96142abe37e7
- Authors
- Markus Sullivan
- Reported year
- 2026
- Reported language
- en
- Source type
- conference-paper
- First detected
- 2026-11-14T02:47:23.747932+00:00
- Last metadata observation
- 2026-11-14T02:47:23.747932+00:00
- Last HTTP verification
- Not checked
Documentary abstract — original language
Almost a decade following the implementation of the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), marked by sustained opposition to calls for amendments, the European Commission has abruptly embarked on a pursuit of substantial revisions, citing competitiveness concerns as a primary motivation. This paper analyses, from a corporate practitioner’s perspective, the relation between political interference in regulatory enforcement, the resulting distortion of corporate compliance incentives, and the consequences for different market participants — including the specific risks of legislative revision during a period of shifting the Overton window on fundamental rights. Drawing on a synthesis of deterrence theory, regulatory capture scholarship, and GDPR market effects, the paper’s central contention is that the current reform trajectory — driven by the Draghi Report and proposed through the Digital Omnibus Package — will predictably deepen the competitive disadvantage of law-abiding firms rather than alleviate it, ultimately worsening the competitiveness it purports to address. The paper concludes that the enforcement deficit, rather than the regulatory text itself, is the primary source of the competitiveness problem, and that any attempt to amend the GDPR while enforcement remains structurally weak will accelerate its deterioration. Addressing the enforcement deficit must therefore be treated as a mandatory prerequisite before any further legislative revision is considered.
Identifiers
- OPENALEX
- https://openalex.org/W7204818925
- DOI
- 10.1007/978-3-032-35899-8_8
Documentary context
- Documentary family
- conference_paper
- Source-reported types
- conference-paper
- Publishers
- Springer Science+Business Media
Entity mentions are not evidence of legal recognition. Jurisdiction studied is separate from author affiliation country.
Sources
OpenAlex · Record 1
Cite this reference
Markus Sullivan. Enforcement, Market Distortion, and the Danger of Reforming Fundamental Rights Under Pressure. 2026. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-032-35899-8_8
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APA, Chicago, ISO 690: bibliographic formats using available fields. OSCOLA / Bluebook: structured data only; full legal citation compliance is not claimed without verification of required elements.
- APA
- Markus Sullivan. (2026). Enforcement, Market Distortion, and the Danger of Reforming Fundamental Rights Under Pressure. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-032-35899-8_8
- Chicago
- Markus Sullivan. Enforcement, Market Distortion, and the Danger of Reforming Fundamental Rights Under Pressure. 2026. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-032-35899-8_8
- ISO 690
- Markus Sullivan. Enforcement, Market Distortion, and the Danger of Reforming Fundamental Rights Under Pressure. 2026. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-032-35899-8_8
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UDTR Global Rights of Nature Legal Library. Enforcement, Market Distortion, and the Danger of Reforming Fundamental Rights Under Pressure. Documentary record: https://www.declarationuniverselledesdroitsdelarbre.org/global-rights-of-nature-radar/reference/r-10c4751b6d8fd16dd7fb96142abe37e7/ · Last HTTP verification: not performed
Research dossiers and documentary relations
Source roles
Bibliographic / original publication source · https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-032-35899-8_8
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Documentary status
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